An independent-minded, preliminary valuation analysis of CF Montréal, using the San Jose Earthquakes as a comparable, examining MLS transfer economics, and distinguishing a seller’s asking price from a buyer’s defensible valuation.
November 15, 2026 | Preliminary analysis | All amounts in US dollars unless otherwise indicated
The difference between an asking price and a transaction price
As an intermediary, agent or investment banker, my responsibility is not to repeat a seller’s expectations. It is to determine whether a credible buyer can support them.
If I approach a prospective investor and say, “Mr. Saputo may have floated a figure of C$700 million to Luc Poirier,” the conversation could end before it begins.
Not because CF Montréal lacks value. Quite the contrary. Professional sports franchises are scarce assets, and Montréal is a significant North American sports market with a passionate fan base, an established soccer culture and considerable untapped commercial potential.
But sophisticated investors do not deploy hundreds of millions of dollars because someone suggests a number.
They have advisers, investment committees, alternative opportunities and fiduciary obligations. My job is to present an initial analysis that their advisers can examine without immediately dismissing its assumptions.
Then comes the second, equally important task: articulating a business model and strategic vision that makes the opportunity compelling.
First, establish what the asset is worth today. Then demonstrate what it could become tomorrow. And only then consider bidding.
That process generally begins with preliminary discussions and an indication of interest (IOI), followed by a letter of intent (LOI), due diligence, negotiated term sheets where appropriate, and ultimately definitive agreements and league approvals.
Social-media speculation that CF Montréal must fetch C$700 million or inevitably relocate to the United States is not a substitute for financial analysis. Relocation is neither automatic nor simply a seller’s unilateral decision; MLS governance, territorial rights and league approvals matter.
Nor should we forget the seller’s investment bankers. Their responsibility is to maximize value for their client and run a credible process. The prospective buyer’s responsibility is to remain disciplined.
I’ve experienced that disconnect firsthand.
In 2019, I engaged CIBC to explore strategic alternatives for WatchMojo. The process did not produce a transaction near my expectations. The following year, I ultimately completed a transaction with Star Mountain Capital myself (CIBC just supported finalizing matters along with our counsel at Osler and accounting firm E&H). With the Montreal Baseball Restoration Group (aka Peanut Project), I have basically repeated this approach of serving as banker myself.
That experience reinforced an important lesson: a business is not necessarily worth what its owner believes it should be worth, nor what an adviser believes it can market for. Its transaction value emerges when a qualified buyer and willing seller agree on price, structure, risk and future opportunity.
The same discipline should apply to CF Montréal.
1. Start with the published benchmarks
The following figures are drawn from the preliminary comparative materials prepared for this analysis. Published franchise values are estimates, not confirmed acquisition prices.
| Metric | San Jose Earthquakes | CF Montréal |
|---|---|---|
| Sportico estimated value | $585M | $430M |
| Forbes estimated value | $550M | $440M |
| Annual revenue | $68M | $48M |
| Operating income | −$4M | −$7M |
| Operating margin | −5.9% | −14.6% |
| Forbes valuation / revenue | 8.1× | 9.2× |
| Stadium | Club-owned PayPal Park | Stade Saputo leasehold |
Source: uploaded comparable analysis, citing 2026 Sportico and Forbes estimates for the 2025 season. Figures and ownership interests require independent verification.
Revenue and estimated franchise value
US$ millions. Published estimates, not transaction prices.
■ San Jose
■ CF Montréal
The difference is revealing.
San Jose generates approximately 42% more annual revenue, incurs a smaller operating loss and controls a stadium asset that CF Montréal does not own on equivalent terms.
Yet CF Montréal’s published valuation-to-revenue multiple is higher.
That does not prove the published valuation is wrong. Franchise scarcity, market potential, league economics and strategic buyers can justify premiums. It does, however, establish why a prospective acquirer should challenge the headline figures.
2. A stadium is not merely a stadium
San Jose operates in the Bay Area, one of the wealthiest corporate and technology markets in the world, with access to Silicon Valley’s sponsorship ecosystem.
Its approximately 18,000-seat PayPal Park is owned and operated by the club. The precise land interests and transferable rights still require diligence.
CF Montréal plays at approximately 19,600-seat Stade Saputo, under a different property structure involving Olympic Park land and a long-term leasehold arrangement.
These are not identical asset packages.
A buyer must distinguish the value of the MLS operating interest from stadium ownership, land rights, commercial contracts, naming rights, non-matchday revenue and future capital obligations.
And those differences become even more important when discussing a transaction price substantially above published franchise valuations.
3. Normalizing the San Jose comparable
The more recent San Jose transaction reference in the supplied analysis is US$625 million. That figure should be verified against the actual transaction perimeter, including whether stadium interests, debt and other assets are included.
A preliminary valuation bridge follows:
| Adjustment | Illustrative amount |
|---|---|
| San Jose transaction reference | $625M |
| Stadium and real-estate differences | −$50M to −$100M |
| Revenue, profitability and market differences | −$60M to −$100M |
| Winter calendar and capital expenditure risk | −$15M to −$35M |
| Implied CF Montréal range | $390M–$500M |
US$ millions. Arithmetic range based on the supplied adjustment assumptions; not a formal appraisal. The original presentation rounded its upper conclusion to $510M. Discounts may overlap, so they should not be applied mechanically.
These adjustments are not arbitrary assertions about the value of Stade Saputo or the attractiveness of Montréal. They are hypotheses to be tested against the seller’s financial statements, stadium agreements, commercial rights and forward operating projections.
For example, a portion of the economic benefit of owning a stadium is already reflected in a club’s revenue and operating income. Deducting the full hypothetical stadium value and then applying an additional earnings discount could double-count the same difference.
The comparable should therefore anchor negotiations, not dictate the purchase price.
4. Three scenarios, three different investment cases
CF Montréal — indicative valuation scenarios
US$ millions; scenarios from the uploaded valuation analysis.

The original analysis also identifies a more conservative initial indication of interest and a revised central transaction estimate. These are distinct from the wider comparable-derived valuation scenarios.
| Stage | US$ valuation |
|---|---|
| Initial indication of interest | $350M–$375M |
| Target negotiated outcome | $375M–$425M |
| Potential stretch | $450M |
| Revised central estimate | $400M–$450M |
The central range of US$400 million to US$450 million is the more appropriate working benchmark for preliminary discussions, provided diligence supports the assumptions.
A competitive process, particularly one involving a strategic buyer with unique synergies, could produce a higher price. Conversely, significant capital expenditure, deteriorating operations or adverse contractual findings could justify a lower one.
5. The C$700 million question
At an illustrative exchange rate of C$1.40 per US$1, a C$700 million valuation equals approximately US$500 million.
That is above our central transaction estimate, but not beyond the outer range of the comparable-derived analysis.
It would require stronger assumptions regarding the asset’s earnings potential, stadium economics, growth opportunities or strategic scarcity premium.
And it is essential to distinguish three numbers:
The seller’s desired price, the asset’s estimated value and the buyer’s total acquisition cost.
The last figure can differ from the first two because of league-related transaction charges, financing expenses, advisory fees, assumed obligations and required post-acquisition investment.
MLS transfer-related charges are especially important. Their applicable rate, fee base, allocation between buyer and seller, and potential exceptions must be confirmed from current league documentation. We should not treat an unverified percentage as a universal tax.
Likewise, a reported conversation between Joey Saputo and Luc Poirier is not evidence of a binding offer, a formal reserve price or an executable transaction.
A rumored C$700 million figure should be treated as a negotiation reference—not a market-clearing price.
6. From valuation to value creation: the QSME opportunity
Once a defensible acquisition range has been established, the strategic conversation can begin.
The proposed Québec / Granicus Sports, Media & Entertainment platform is designed to address a fundamental weakness of the standalone sports-franchise model: its dependence on league distributions, sponsorship, ticketing and the economics of a limited number of home matches.
The proposal separates three businesses:
| Vehicle | Economic opportunity |
|---|---|
| ClubCo | MLS franchise operations, academy, ticketing, league distributions and sponsorship |
| Media / IP Co | WatchMojo, AceMojo, original productions, documentaries, licensing and permitted club storytelling |
| 4C / Venue Co | Cultural destinations, museum, ASE, hospitality, events and potential real-estate development |
The underlying thesis is that a professional sports club can become the foundation for a diversified sports, media and entertainment platform.
But an investor should not pay the seller today for value that the buyer must create, finance and execute tomorrow.
This is particularly important with the proposed Expos franchise and associated 4C development. Those opportunities remain contingent on separate awards, financing, rights and approvals.
They should not be assumed to form part of CF Montréal’s existing value.
An illustrative alternative to an all-cash acquisition
Undoubtedly, the sellers may favour (and it will likely require an all cash bid). But in general, it is not unrealistic for sellers who do not receive bids meeting their expectation to consider a structure that gives them upside in the future build out of the business.
The strategic-combination presentation contemplates a C$500 million reference structure involving C$250 million of new cash, C$150 million of seller rollover equity and up to C$100 million in potential gross commercial contracts over ten years.
That commercial pipeline is not guaranteed seller consideration. Nor does C$250 million of cash plus C$150 million of rollover automatically constitute a C$500 million purchase price.
Any transaction must reconcile the seller’s actual consideration, the equity valuation, the value of contributed assets, and any separately negotiated earn-out.
Nevertheless, the concept offers a potentially compelling discussion: liquidity today, continued family participation and exposure to a broader future platform.
7. What happens next?
A credible acquisition process would require a confidential information memorandum, independently reviewed financial information, stadium and rights diligence, an MLS-compliant ownership structure, and evidence of committed capital.
Prospective investors should first evaluate the standalone club, then assess the incremental opportunity from QSME.
Only after those steps should an indicative bid become a negotiated transaction.
The seller’s advisers may disagree with our assumptions. Indeed, they should challenge them. A credible valuation exercise is not designed to produce a predetermined number; it is designed to survive scrutiny.
Conclusion: The price of history versus the value of the future
Joey Saputo and his family helped build professional soccer in Montréal. That legacy is real, and it has value.
But historical contribution and future acquisition value are different concepts.
A prospective buyer must respect the former without confusing it with the latter.
The objective is not to acquire CF Montréal at the lowest imaginable price. It is to establish a fair, defensible transaction that rewards the seller, protects investors and provides sufficient capital to build a sustainable enterprise.
Our preliminary working estimate remains US$400 million to US$450 million, subject to diligence, transaction structure and MLS approval.
What could make CF Montréal significantly more valuable in the future is not simply the franchise itself, but the possibility of combining sports, media, intellectual property, entrepreneurship and year-round commercial experiences.
That is the vision worth presenting to investors.
First, determine what the club is worth. Then demonstrate what it could become.
Granicus Group Advisors — Preliminary, illustrative commentary based on supplied transaction and strategy materials. This is not a fairness opinion, independent appraisal, securities offering, verified financing commitment or representation of the seller’s position. Published estimates and reported transaction details require external verification.
Companion presentation:
Granicus Group Advisors — CF Montréal Valuation Analysis









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