The opportunity cost of choosing to build something for a community instead of simply collecting management fees and carried interest.
There is something profoundly ironic about the criticism I have received over the past year as I’ve pursued what began as the improbable mission to restore the Montréal Expos.
Some people question my motives. Others question my qualifications. Some suggest that I must somehow be looking to enrich myself.
Fair enough. Ask questions. Scrutinize the numbers. Challenge the assumptions.
But let’s examine the economics of the road I didn’t take.
Over the past year, as I’ve assembled capital commitments, engaged institutional investors, developed relationships with sports executives and financial institutions, and explored opportunities involving the Montréal Expos, CF Montréal and potentially the Québec Nordiques, something became increasingly clear.
There is a considerably easier way to make money in professional sports than trying to restore beloved franchises to their communities.
It’s called managing other people’s money.
And the economics are extraordinary.
1. The $1.5 Billion Alternative
Imagine that instead of pursuing the restoration of the Expos, I had raised US$1.5 billion to establish a sports-focused private equity investment platform, broadly inspired by firms such as Arctos Partners and Blue Owl.
I could have allocated US$1.4 billion across seven professional sports investments, committing US$200 million to each, while retaining US$100 million in reserve.

No need to become the controlling owner of a franchise. No need to persuade an entire city, navigate municipal land-use questions, assemble a stadium development consortium or convince a league to expand.
Simply acquire minority positions in established sports properties, work with ownership groups, benefit from the long-term appreciation of scarce sports assets and eventually sell those positions.
Of course, raising the fund and executing those investments would hardly be effortless. But compared with restoring an entire franchise, the model offers a much more conventional path to monetizing the growth of professional sports.
For illustration, assume the portfolio generates a 13% compounded annual return over five years.

US$ billions, before fund fees and carried interest

Illustrative model: seven simultaneous US$200M investments compounding at 13% annually, with all investments sold after five years.
The US$1.4 billion invested becomes approximately US$2.58 billion.
That’s nearly US$1.18 billion in investment profits.
And that is before considering what the fund manager earns.
2. The Economics of Managing Other People’s Capital
A traditional private equity structure is often described as 2 and 20.
The fund manager receives an annual management fee, commonly illustrated at 2% of committed capital, and a performance allocation, commonly illustrated at 20% of investment profits.
The remaining 80% of profits belongs to the limited partners, subject to the actual fund waterfall and other negotiated terms.
These are illustrative terms, not a claim about the specific fee arrangements of Arctos or Blue Owl.
On US$1.5 billion in committed capital, a 2% annual management fee generates US$30 million per year.
Over five years, that’s US$150 million.
EXHIBIT 3 — MANAGEMENT FEE SCENARIOS
| Annual fee | Per year | Five years |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0% | $15M | $75M |
| 1.5% | $22.5M | $112.5M |
| 2.0% | $30M | $150M |
Assumes annual management fees calculated on US$1.5B in committed capital.
Consider what that means.
Before a single investment has been sold, the management company could generate US$150 million in gross revenue over five years.
That revenue pays for investment professionals, analysts, lawyers, accountants, compliance, sourcing and operations.
And if the manager runs an efficient operation, a portion can become operating profit.
But the real upside comes from carried interest.
3. The 80/20 Split: The Power of Carried Interest
The portfolio has appreciated from US$1.4 billion to approximately US$2.58 billion.
That produces nearly US$1.18 billion in investment profits.
Under a simplified 80/20 profit-sharing arrangement:
- 80% goes to the limited partners: approximately US$943.5 million in profits.
- 20% goes to the general partner: approximately US$235.9 million in carried interest.
The LPs also receive their original invested capital back, assuming a successful full exit.
EXHIBIT 4 — DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT PROFITS
Who earns the $1.179B investment profit?
US$ millions, simplified 80/20 profit split

Excludes return of original capital, management fees, preferred returns, and other potential fund waterfall provisions.
The general partner’s carry depends on the agreed structure. A fund with an 8% preferred return and no catch-up, for example, could produce substantially less carry. A full catch-up arrangement could ultimately restore a 20% share of eligible profits.
Nevertheless, the central point remains: the economics of managing capital can be enormously attractive.
EXHIBIT 5 — CARRIED INTEREST SCENARIOS
| Carry rate | GP performance fee |
|---|---|
| 10% | $117.9M |
| 15% | $176.9M |
| 20% | $235.9M |
| 25% | $294.9M |
And when you combine management fees and carried interest, the numbers become even more striking.
EXHIBIT 6 — FIVE-YEAR GROSS REVENUE TO FUND MANAGER / GP

Hypothetical gross manager economics before operating expenses, compensation, taxes and carry-sharing arrangements. Management fees are assumed to be funded separately from the invested principal.
Nearly US$386 million in gross management fees and carried interest over five years.
Not personal earnings. Not guaranteed profits. Not a prediction.
A hypothetical illustration of what a successful sports investment management business could generate under traditional private equity economics.
And here’s the kicker.
After five years, the manager doesn’t necessarily close shop.
A successful fund manager might raise Fund II, then Fund III.
The enterprise itself becomes valuable because it generates recurring management fees and potentially substantial performance income.
In other words, instead of building a sports franchise, I could have tried to build a sports investment management company.
4. So Why Am I Doing Something Considerably Harder?
Now contrast that with what I have actually chosen to pursue.
The Montréal Expos: Restore a baseball franchise that has been absent for more than two decades. Assemble an ownership group, pursue an MLB expansion opportunity, identify suitable land, develop a privately financed stadium and build a year-round creative, cultural and commercial campus around it.
CF Montréal: Explore a potential acquisition that could preserve the club’s long-term future in Montréal, while reimagining the business model through media, entertainment, education, international partnerships and new revenue opportunities.
The Québec Nordiques: Explore whether the same network of investors, financial institutions, commercial partners and sports executives could help create a credible pathway toward the return of NHL hockey to Québec City, should the league and an appropriate ownership group see an opportunity.
None of these outcomes is guaranteed.
The Expos require MLB approval. CF Montréal would require a successful transaction and MLS approval. The Nordiques would require an NHL pathway that does not presently exist as an approved franchise award.
And all three require considerable capital.
But here’s the question.
Why is someone who could potentially earn substantial fees managing sports investments criticized for instead trying to put sports franchises back into the communities that love them?
5. The Opportunity Cost Nobody Talks About
I have spent more than two decades building WatchMojo.
I’ve negotiated transactions, raised capital, dealt with institutional investors, navigated legal and financial complexities, and experienced the difference between a transaction that looks compelling on paper and one that actually closes.
I understand how investment managers make money.
I understand how advisors make money.
I understand how intermediaries make money.
And I certainly understand that there’s nothing inherently wrong with any of those activities.
Capital formation is essential. Investment management creates value. Advisors and intermediaries can play indispensable roles.
But at some point, one has to ask: To what end?
If the objective were simply to maximize my potential financial compensation, why would I voluntarily choose the path that involves more public scrutiny, more political complexity, more stakeholders, more uncertainty and considerably more work?
Why not simply build a sports investment fund?
Why not earn management fees while institutional capital compounds?
Why not collect carried interest when those investments are sold?
Instead, I’m trying to do something that, if successful, would leave behind institutions that outlast me.
A restored baseball franchise.
A stronger professional soccer club.
And perhaps, one day, the return of a hockey team that an entire city still misses.
6. I’m Not Asking for a Medal. I’m Asking for Intellectual Honesty.
Let me be clear: I am not claiming that any of these projects is charity.
Professional sports franchises are businesses. Investors need returns. Capital has an opportunity cost. Anyone putting hundreds of millions of dollars into these ventures deserves a credible financial thesis.
And yes, I would expect to participate economically in ventures I help create, subject to whatever arrangements are ultimately agreed.
But there is an enormous difference between creating personal wealth as the primary objective and building something economically sustainable that also generates enormous community value.
The two are not mutually exclusive.
In fact, the best businesses frequently accomplish both.
What I find increasingly difficult to understand is the instinct to attack the person attempting the harder, more visible and more uncertain undertaking, while celebrating those who simply acquire stakes in existing assets and monetize their appreciation.
One approach primarily reallocates ownership of existing franchises.
The other seeks to restore, preserve or create institutions.
Both can be legitimate.
But surely we can recognize that they are not the same undertaking.
7. The Real Return on Investment
Imagine Montréal in 2035.
The Expos are playing baseball in a modern stadium.
CF Montréal is competing in a thriving professional soccer ecosystem.
Québec City has regained its Nordiques.
Thousands of people are employed directly and indirectly. Restaurants, hotels, retailers, media companies and local entrepreneurs benefit from the activity surrounding these franchises.
Young athletes have more pathways to pursue their dreams.
And families have new memories to share across generations.
That is the vision.
It isn’t a forecast. It isn’t a promise. It’s what I’m working toward.
Now imagine the alternative.
I raise US$1.5 billion, invest it across seven sports properties, earn the hypothetical US$386 million in gross fees and carry, and eventually sell the positions.
That would be an impressive financial achievement.
But it wouldn’t restore the Expos.
It wouldn’t preserve CF Montréal.
And it wouldn’t bring the Nordiques back to Québec City.
8. The Bottom Line
People are free to criticize my methods, my assumptions, my public commentary and my ambitions.
That’s part of pursuing something publicly.
But don’t confuse ambition with greed. Don’t confuse the desire to build something with the desire to extract something.
Had I wanted to maximize fees, I could have tried to become another sports investment manager.
Instead, I’ve chosen to pursue something far more complicated, with no guarantee of success.
The economics of the alternative are there for anyone to examine.
US$1.5 billion in capital.
Seven investments.
A hypothetical 13% annual return.
Approximately US$386 million in gross management fees and carried interest over five years.
That’s the road not taken.
Because when all is said and done, I’d rather be remembered as someone who helped bring the Expos back than someone who collected a management fee from owning 10% of seven other teams.
You can make a fortune owning pieces of other people’s legacies.
Or you can try to build a legacy of your own.
I’m choosing the latter.









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