Early on in the Peanut Project journey – our effort to restore the Montreal Expos, I explained that it didn’t make sense for most of the usual suspects. A third-generation custodian of capital like Stephen Bronfman would not want to underwrite a $2B expansion fee, and someone like Habs owner Geoff Molson would not view adding another sports franchise as additive. Indeed, it would split some of his corporate demand and cut into his Evenko revenues. For me, as an agent and architect, playing the role of consultant and investment banker, I could present “baseball in Montreal” wrapped in a broader civic project and entertainment district to investors abroad (anchored by a local HNWI or Family Office) as a means to an end.
Similarly, it is unrealistic for any local billionaire to look at CF Montreal and make it make sense to them.
As with the Expos, we have to redraw the battleground. In the days to come, I’ll explain how. But let’s start off with a gut check.
The fundamental distinction is that the Expos are a franchise-creation opportunity, while CF Montréal is a franchise-acquisition and turnaround opportunity.
The Expos offer potentially greater long-term upside through a new MLB franchise, stadium and 4C ecosystem—but depend on MLB awarding Montréal an expansion team. CF Montréal offers an existing professional sports business that investors can evaluate and potentially acquire now, but one with operating losses, established obligations and limited autonomy under MLS’s centralized structure.
Side-by-side comparison
| Dimension | Montréal Expos — Peanut Project | CF Montréal — Potential Acquisition |
|---|---|---|
| Transaction | Apply for and secure a new MLB expansion franchise | Acquire an existing MLS franchise from the Saputo family |
| Status | Expansion has not formally been awarded; bid under development | Formal sale process announced November 9, 2026 |
| Timing | Dependent on MLB expansion decisions, CBA and league approvals | Actionable now, subject to seller timetable and MLS approval |
| Indicative franchise value | US$2B–2.25B planning assumption | Published estimates around US$400M–440M |
| League economics | MLB’s established national media, licensing and revenue-sharing ecosystem | MLS single-entity structure, centralized commercial arrangements and league distributions |
| Profitability | No current operating losses because the new franchise doesn’t exist; future profitability unproven | Reported 2025 operating EBITDA approximately −US$7M |
| Stadium | New privately financed retractable-roof stadium required; approximately US$1.5B proposed investment | Existing Stade Saputo; property rights, lease obligations and future capital needs require diligence |
| Real estate | Major greenfield development opportunity through the proposed 4C campus | Existing infrastructure; incremental real estate opportunities depend on ownership and land rights |
| Ownership rules | MLB private-equity ownership restrictions; anchor/control-person requirements | MLS institutional ownership restrictions and league-approved controlling investor |
| Media rights | Established MLB national rights plus potentially substantial local/regional media opportunities, subject to MLB rules | Apple-centered centralized MLS rights; club has limited freedom to independently monetize live matches |
| Competitive position | New expansion club would build its roster and baseball operations from scratch | Existing club, players, academy, supporters, history and competitive challenges |
| Investor proposition | Build an entirely new sports and entertainment enterprise | Acquire a scarce asset, repair its operations and expand its commercial value |
| Principal risk | MLB may not select Montréal | Overpaying for a loss-making franchise or underestimating turnaround costs |
| Strategic advantage | Potential to design ownership, infrastructure and business model from inception | Existing operating platform and a defined acquisition process |
| Role for WatchMojo / AceMojo | Develop an integrated media and IP ecosystem from the beginning | Accelerate commercial transformation through original content, storytelling and sponsorship |
| Relationship to 4C | Central to the stadium and district development vision | Potential complementary participant, not necessarily dependent on a new stadium |
| Exit / liquidity | Investment depends first on receiving an expansion franchise | Existing MLS ownership interest potentially transferable with league approval |
“Buy on Rumour, Sell on News”
The most important difference for investors is certainty of the asset versus certainty of the economics. CF Montréal exists and can be diligenced today, but its valuation must account for losses and obligations. The Expos franchise does not yet exist, but an expansion award would create a fundamentally different investment opportunity.
Additional distinctions that matter to investors
| Dimension | Expos / MLB | CF Montréal / MLS |
|---|---|---|
| League’s motivation | MLB must decide whether, when and where to expand. Montréal must demonstrate why it deserves one of the limited available slots. | MLS already has a Montréal franchise. Its immediate interest is approving a qualified buyer and preserving league value, not necessarily expanding its presence in Québec. |
| Does the league need Montréal? | No, but MLB could see value in restoring a historic baseball market. The challenge is winning that strategic argument. | MLS may prefer the status quo but is ultimately indifferent, and favours setting a new precedent and comparable for future transactions. |
| Seller’s priorities | No selling owner; expansion terms are set through MLB’s process. | Mr. Saputo wants a credible, well-capitalized buyer, preferably Québec-based, but has said he won’t discount the club merely to preserve local ownership. |
| Negotiating leverage | Primarily the strength of the bid relative to other expansion markets. | Price, speed, certainty of closing, financing and the seller’s legacy considerations. |
| Banker involvement | Your team must organize its own capital formation and expansion proposal. | Aware of who the advisors are, but as it has not been disclosed, will not divulge here. |
| Capital requirements | Approximately US$2.25B franchise fee plus US$1.5B stadium in your planning model, before 4C and additional funding needs. | Illustrative US$350M / CAD$500M acquisition plus working capital, operating losses and future investment. Actual sale price remains unknown. |
| Institutional PE limits | Reported framework: up to 30% aggregate PE; 15% maximum per fund. | Reported framework: up to 30% aggregate institutional PE; 20% maximum per fund. |
| Control person | Your working model contemplates an MLB-approved designated control person with meaningful personal ownership. | Requires an MLS-approved controlling owner; don’t assume MLB’s 15% anchor threshold applies. |
| Existing organization | Entire front office, baseball operations and commercial organization must be assembled. | Existing management, staff and academy remain operational during the sale. |
| Management opportunity | Executive roles depend on securing the franchise and establishing the organization. | An approved buyer could begin restructuring and appointing leadership after closing, subject to existing contracts. |
| Potential financial upside | New franchise appreciation, stadium operations, sponsorships, media, 4C and real estate development. | Franchise appreciation plus operational turnaround, stronger attendance, sponsorships and adjacent media/IP opportunities. |
| Downside exposure | Significant pre-award development effort and uncertainty, followed by substantial construction and startup risk. | Immediate exposure to an operating club’s losses, sporting performance and turnaround capital requirements. |
| Urgency for investors | Patient capital comfortable with an uncertain league timetable. | Capital ready to evaluate an acquisition and potentially close on the seller’s timetable. |
Notes:
CF Montréal’s official announcement confirms the sale advisors, preference for Québec investors, and continuity of management, including Luca and Simone Saputo.
The 2026 Forbes estimate of US$440M value, US$48M revenue and −US$7M operating EBITDA is an external estimate, not audited club financials. Forbes The PE limits above reflect publicly reported league frameworks and need confirmation for any proposed 2026 transaction.
The league-motivation distinction deserves special attention
MLB has to be persuaded to return to Montréal. MLS has to be persuaded to remain in Montréal under new ownership.
Paradoxically, MLS has an existing franchise, commercial interests and league relationships in the market. Mr. Saputo has explicitly acknowledged relocation as a possibility if a satisfactory local buyer does not emerge.
That creates a different kind of urgency for the local business community. But, inasmuch as it didn’t make financial sense for Stephen Bronfman to pursue buying 100% of a baseball club, financial analysis does not lead anyone looking at this in a traditional lens to acquire a money-losing club for the purchase price.
EXPOS require patient, transformational capital
Long-duration investors comfortable underwriting franchise creation, stadium development and major-league expansion uncertainty.
CF MONTRÉAL require Immediate, turnaround capital
Investors seeking an existing sports asset with a near-term transaction process and measurable operating improvements.
This nuance helps solve the potential bait-and-switch problem.
The Expos are a build-and-create investment. CF Montréal is a buy-and-transform investment.
Our TEAMS model: Tech, Entertainment, Academic, Media & Sports means that a sports franchise is but one pillar of a larger entity and revenue-generating, value-creating potential.
As such, QSME, WatchMojo, AceMojo, 4C, the Museum and ASE—is the commercial platform that could create synergies between them without requiring identical ownership.
When said and done:
The Montréal Expos represent a generational opportunity to restore a historic MLB franchise and develop a privately financed sports and cultural destination. CF Montréal represents a more immediate opportunity to acquire and revitalize an existing MLS franchise. These are distinct investments, with separate capital requirements and league approvals, but they could ultimately benefit from a shared vision for Montréal as a global sports, media and entertainment hub.
To ask a local buyer to write such a check is simply unrealistic, but to an architect building a larger vehicle and opening this up to a global suite of investors and strategic partners, it may be crazy enough to pull off.
A suivre.
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