FAQ on Iran: Myths & Misconceptions

As the oldest nation in the world, predating even Egypt and going back to 3200 BC, Iran has a long history, which leads to misconceptions about the history, people, culture & politics.

Here are some of the most frequently asked questions and misconceptions of Iran.

– Are Iranians Arabs? 

No. Iranians are Indo-European people who speak Farsi, not Arabic (which is like Hebrew a Semitic language). Though there are Arab-speaking Iranians in the Khuzestan region bordering Iraq, Iranians view themselves as Iranian first, and over generations the division of ethnicities has become more blurry, especially with urbanization throughout the 20th century. 

– Are Persians and Iranians the same?

Iran, or land of the Aryans, consists of many ethnicities: Persians, followed by Azeris, Kurds, Lor, etc. Various sources estimate that the majority group of Iran — the Persians — represent 61% of the population – which stands at 89 million people in 2024. There are also over 4 million Iranians living in the diaspora, with 1.5M in the USA alone. Persians are mostly concentrated in central, southern and eastern regions of the country. Ethnically, they are Indo-Aryans and speak a new Persian language called Farsi (also simply called Persian by some). The second group and largest minority are the Azeris, who represent one in five Iranians; followed by the Kurds, the third-largest ethnic group in Iran. Arabs make up of 2% of Iranians, living predominantly near the Iraqi border.

– Was Iran “created” by western powers?

No. While the Sykes-Picot agreement led to the creation of states like Iraq, Syria, Jordan etc., Iran is – according to the UN – the oldest nation in the world, predating even Egypt, dating back to 3200 BC.

– What is the name of the country, Iran or Persia?

Iran was always known as Iran (derived from the 3rd-century Sasanian Middle Persian ērān, where it initially meant “of the Aryans”). It was always known by its endonym, Iran, until Europeans attributed the exonym Persia. In 1935, Reza Shah asked the international community to refer to the nation as Iran. Reza Shah was in fact from the Mazandaran region, in northern Iran; so it’s certainly possible that some of the drive to refer to the nation as Iran and not Persia was that Mazanadaris were not Persian – but this last part is my interpretation based on psychology and sociology.

– Are Iranians religious?

Not really, but as with all societies, the answer is “it depends.” Iranians have always been somewhat conservative. Iranians are spiritual, no doubt, and the first religion was Zoroastrianism, founded by the first great Iranian leader, Zarathustra (or Zartosht), which influenced all three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity & Islam. In the 7th century, conquering Arabs converted Iranians to Islam. In the next millennium, the Safavids introduced Shia Islam to Iranians, who adopted and maintained the religion until now. Throughout the 20th century, religion’s influence was lessened by Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah, angering many clerics. In the 1970s, the clerics joined forces with the marxists and toppled the monarchy, ushering an Islamic revolution, which converted the secular constitutional monarchy into a theocratic republic. Today, as the country’s demographics get younger, religion has waned in popularity. Indeed, according to surveys conducted, in one, by Gamaan, when asked about their preferred regime type:

• 34% chose a “secular republic”
• 22% the “Islamic republic”
• 19% a “constitutional monarchy”
• 3% an “absolute monarchy”.

About the head of state: 

• around 78% opposed this function being passed down through heredity,
• 72% opposed the head of state being a (Shia) religious authority, and
• 66% think the head of state should not appointed/elected for life.
• Also, 56% oppose the head of state being an Atheist.

Asking about the political leaders of Iran’s modern history: 

• 66% have a positive view of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878-1944) while 23% evaluate him negatively. 
• Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980) is viewed positively by 64%, while 28% judge him negatively. 
• Mohammad Mossadegh’s (1882-1967) popularity is similar, with 64% positive responses and 27% negative.
• In contrast, 28% have a positive view of Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), while 64% evaluate him negatively.
• Finally, approximately 26% of the population evaluate Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei (b. 1939), positively, while 66% judge him negatively.

According to another, by ERF.i: 

• An overwhelming 60.4% of Iranians support a return to a constitutional monarchy in Iran 
• while only 17.5% favored a democratic republic 
• The remaining 14.5% are still undecided. 
• Many Iranians reject the ideals of the 1979 revolution. 
• It is almost as if they want to return to the time before the 1979-Revolution when the constitutional monarchy held sway: “Pahlavi nostalgia is further reflected in the survey’s findings that 79.9% of Iranians overwhelmingly favor Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi over the current political leaders.”

Finally, Iranians are also increasingly looking to secularize their country, with a government survey leaked to BBC Persian showing support for a demarcation between religion and state climbing from 31% in 2015 to 74% today. 

– Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, was Iran a constitutional monarchy?

Yes, in theory, the 1906 Constitutional Revolution limited the power of the Qajar dynasty, whom history views as having weakened Iran through territorial concessions and poor economic policy. By 1925, the brigadier general in the Iranian Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan, seized power and led as a constitutional monarch, ending feudalism, modernizing the nation’s transportation network with the introduction of a train system, introduced a ban on the hijab, redistributed land, etc. By 1941, his affinity to (Nazi) Germany during World War II became problematic for the USSR and the UK (members of the Allied Forces), who forced him to step down. In order to preserve his Pahlavi dynasty, his son Mohammad Reza rose to the throne and continued his father’s policies. The USSR’s expansionist ambitions led to the presence of socialists and marxists; while some of the anti-religious policies angered the clerics, whose viewpoints were brewing in the city of Qom, and amplified by Khomeini, who had decamped to Iraq.

These two groups – hence the Islamo-Marxist alliance, as paradoxical as that sounds – joined forces to weaken the monarchy. As such, by the 1960/70s, the Shah used elements of absolute monarchies and even royal dictatorship due to the risks posed by elements in society that wanted to topple him. In all fairness, around the world at the time, the Iranian monarchy was ahead of its time as a constitutional monarchy, but by comparing Iran in 1975 with say for example constitutional monarchies in Sweden or Canada in 2024 is a bit of an unfair, apples-to-oranges comparison. 

– What is the connection between British Petroleum (BP), the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) & the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)?

The British Empire was the most powerful empire at the turn of the 20th century. In 1901, William Knox D’Arcy, a millionaire London socialite, negotiated an oil concession with Mozaffar al-Din Shah of the Qajar dynasty. D’Arcy negotiated rights to prospect for oil in most of the Iran territory. In 1909, British Petroleum (BP) was set up as a subsidiary of the Burmah company (eventually merged with Castrol) that had originally secured these rights. Eventually in 1923, the paid consultant Winston Churchill (yes, that Winston Churchill) lobbied the British government to allow the APOC to have exclusive rights to Persian oil resources. The earliest deal was largely beneficial to the UK, which at first Iranians needed to develop the industry, but over time the unequal revenue distribution angered Iranians, which led to the drive to nationalize the oil industry. In 1951, the Anglo Persian Oil Company was rebranded as the National Iranian Oil Company. By 1954, the Anglo Iranian Oil Company effectively became British Petroleum, and the Shah’s return did not mean that BP could continue to monopolize Iranian oil as before. Under pressure from the US – and perhaps in exchange for the US’ support in Operation Ajax, or Boot, as the Brits called it – BP reluctantly accepted membership in a consortium of companies, founded in October 1954, to bring back Iranian oil to the international market. The new Iranian Oil Participants (IOP) included British Petroleum (40%), Gulf (later Chevron, 8%), Royal Dutch Shell (14%), and Compagnie Française des Pétroles (later Total, 6%). The four Aramco partners – Standard Oil of California (SoCal, later Chevron) – Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon, then ExxonMobil) – Standard Oil Co. of New York (later Mobil, then ExxonMobil) – Texaco (later Chevron) – each held an 8% stake in the holding company.

– Was Mohammad Mossadegh “democratically elected?”

A common misconception repeated in media is that Iran’s 30th prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh – Time magazine’s person of the year in 1953 – was “democratically elected.” The son of a Qajari princess, Mossadegh was never “elected” by the people. He was appointed by the 16th Majlis (parliament) and rose to become prime minister. Capitalizing on the people’s desire to nationalize the oil industry and grow his power, he was dismissed, and subsequently put under house arrest. Mossadegh was popular and respected by many in the country, but he was never democratically elected, and this notion that foreign forces somehow removed him is incomplete and to some extent, false. I would add that even the Shah recognized that the earliest oil agreements with the British were unfair to Iranians, but as any “CEO” he had to update the original agreements while recognizing the terms and conditions therein, whereas politicians like Mossadegh could ride populist sentiments to “tear up” old agreements to establish something new, better and more equitable. Ultimately, Iran nationalized the oil industry which angered the British who were losing lucrative sources of revenue and a needed resource for their own industrial and consumer needs.

– Was Mossadegh’s 1953 coup orchestrated by the British and Americans?

Concerned about the potential loss of oil revenue, the British were undoubtedly distraught about the drive to nationalize the oil industry. Operation Ajax was orchestrated by the British (project Boot) and aided by Americans; but Mossadegh’s attempt to dissolve the parliament to strengthen his power angered Iranians and also led to his downfall. To suggest that his downfall was only a result of foreign forces, or a reflection of growing internal dissent alone are both unfair. As with many political developments, a confluence of factors led to his dismissal (similar to what led to the Shah’s downfall), which undoubtedly planted seeds of distrust amongst Iranians who viewed the meddling of Iran’s internal affairs as an encroachment of Iran’s sovereignty.

– “The Shah wasn’t really Persian”

Indeed, Reza Khan was Mazanderani, one of the many ethnicities in Iran, but he certainly was Iranian, who count Persians, Azeri, Kurds, Lor, and of course Mazanderani as part of the ethnicities that make up Iran. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that he sought (amongst other reasons) to change the name of the country from Persia to Iran, to reflect the mosaic of ethnicities.

– Was the Shah an authoritarian dictator?

When the US & UK helped depose Mossadegh and reinstalled the Shah after he left for Italy for a few days, the Shah strengthened his grip on power. But Iranian history is very partisan: if you support the current regime, you view the Shah as a dictator who used his secret service (SAVAK) to stomp on people’s freedoms. If you’re critical of the regime and support a return to a (constitutional) monarchy, then you hate the theocracy and yearn for a return to the old days, and view the Shah as a saint (so to speak). Truth is a bit more nuanced: starting with Reza Shah in the 1920s, the Pahlavis modernized the nation, his son Mohammad Reza further industrialized the economy in the 1950s throughout the 1970s and introduced many reforms that led to freedoms and liberties. Given the pace of change and impact some of those reforms had, certain sections of the population (i.e. clerics, who lost land with the end of tribalism and introduction of land redistribution, and disagreed with the secularization of the country) were critical of the government. As in most countries, a number of dissidents were either exiled (eg. Ayatollah Khomeini) or imprisoned. While western media pegged the number of prisoners at 100,000, the actual number – 3,000 according to Mohammad Reza in an interview with CBS in the 1970s – was lower. The Shah was concerned about Marxists (due to the historical influence of Russia/USSR) and clerics, whom he tried to appease but were ultimately his downfall. The bottom line is that Reza Khan, Mohammad Reza were net positives (by a wide margin) who along with Zarathustra, Cyrus the Great, Reza and Mohammad Reza Shah and (agree or disagree) Khomeini, were strong leaders who captured the imagination of the people and shaped history.

– Was the 1979 movement a revolution or a coup?

Similarly, if you were critical of the Shah, secularism, modernization, the growing of Western influence on Iranian society and so on, you view the events of 1979 as a revolution, and an Islamic one at that. In 1979, Iran had a population just under 40 million, but it didn’t take millions to lead to the toppling of the Shah. Clerics had been under-estimated as a force, while the spectre of marxists viewed as the main risk to their Shah’s rule. It’s fair to say that many Iranians supported the Shah, but those who took to the streets were those critical of his regime. Like a kettle coming to a boil, the revolutionary movement gathered steam in universities and clerics seized the opportunity. In the 1960s, the Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Iraq, before asking the Iraqi regime to exile him further to France. Perched in a suburb of Paris, Khomeini held court and was viewed as a Gandhi-like figure who – unlike the marxists & socialists – posed no/little threat to the West, capitalism, etc.

Meanwhile, while the Shah was absolutely installed and supported by the West, his growing confidence and ambitions were becoming a source of concern and consternation to the West who needed Iranian oil to sustain their growth, especially following the 1970s OPEC crisis. Armed with the fifth largest army in the world, the Shah viewed Iran as the Japan of the Mideast, and his confident rhetoric against the West and segments of the Israeli lobby (in interviews with American media, no less) began to ring alarm bells. While critics have called those anti-semitic, the fact remains that the Shah was a strong ally of Israel and before the 1979 revolution, Iran was one of the strongest allies of Israel and America.

The Shah had effectively moved from a perceived “puppet” of the West, to a liability and worse, a threat. But, diagnosed with cancer (unbeknownst to Iranians), the Shah made one catastrophic miscalculation in viewing the marxists as the main threat to his power, when in fact the clerics were fomenting revolutionary sentiment. Domestically, the growing chorus of criticism led by clerics weakened his resolve. By the Guadeloupe conference, Western leaders had decided that the Shah’s days were limited, and may have urged him to avoid cracking down hard on protesters. Not wanting to create tension let alone lead to civil war, the Shah eventually decided to leave, as he had in the 1950s. But whereas he left and returned after a few days in 1953, this time he left Iranian soil – for good, never to return, passing away in Egypt – one of the few countries that greeted him with open arms.

– What’s in a name? Iran vs Islamic Republic of Iran

After the 1979 Revolution, Iran changed its official name to the Islamic Republic of Iran, ending both 2500 years of monarchy and signalling the theocratic nature of the new form of government: a republic. As a republic, Iran holds elections for parliamentary members in its Majlis, but critics would point out that its supreme leader – Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini first, and Imam Ali Khamenei since – holds absolute power, since the clerics ultimately choose which parliamentary candidates can run for the Majlis. Over time, crackdowns on liberties and freedoms have made segments of the population critical of religion, and distrust/disdain republics which the people feel cannot deliver to them the kind of reforms and change they seek.

– Who started the Iran-Iraq war?

Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity following the 1979 revolution to invade Iran to seize control of oil-rich, Arab-speaking Khuzestan. As the West sanctioned Iran post-revolution and cut it off from global markets to buy military weapons and parts, it supplied Iraq with funding, weapons, and intelligence support, fearing that Iran’s Islamic Revolution would expand across the Middle East.

There’s little doubt that Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on his own people and Iranians alike, with the massacre in Halabja against the Kurds in Iraq standing out.

After invading Iran and launching a myriad of surprise aerial attacks to weaken Iranian infrastructure and eliminate the air superiority the Imperial Iranian Air Force had, Iran countered and pushed back Iraq. The strike and counter-strike by the Iraqi and Iranian Air Force represented the largest sorties since World War II. Subsequently renamed the Islamic Iranian Air Force, Iranian pilots – trained in America and flying American planes – gave Iran the ability to fight back, even pulling off one of the most audacious and successful airstrikes in aviation history, setting back the Iraqi Air Force years, and giving Iran time to replenish its army to ultimately repel Iraq, aided by Iran’s advantage in population. Today Iraq boasts over 50 million people, then it had about 15 million. Iran now has nearly 90 million, but then had over 40 million citizens: its scores of human wave attacks where young Iranians sacrificed their lives cost countless lives, but played a pivotal role in Iran’s ultimate resistance.

Despite two waves of purges amongst the Artesh (military), Khomeini did not disband the military, but weakened it by creating the IRGC to defend the Islamic revolution, and over time installing individuals loyal to the regime to run the Artesh, as well. Today the IRGC has an annual budget of over $6 billion, relative to the Artesh’s $2 billion annual expenditures.

After an 8-year war that cost a million lives on both sides, the war ended in a stale mate, though you can argue over a longer arc, Iran prevailed, especially after Saddam’s invasion of Iraq in 1991 put it in America’s cross-hairs and post 9/11, the US toppled the Baath regime in 2003 and allowed Iran to expand its sphere of influence over Baghdad once they left. 

– “The Mullahs are not Iranians”

A common refrain amongst those critical and opposed to the current Islamic Republic regime is that the Mullahs ruling Iran “are not Iranians/Persians.” While some politicians like Ali Larijani and his brother Sadeq Larijani were born in Najaf, Iraq (their religious/cleric parents had been exiled by Reza Khan), most are obviously born in Iran, Iranian if not Persian (i.e. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is Azeri, for example). Conversely, the influential Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani is Iranian born, but lives in Iraq after moving to study in Najaf in 1951. Thus, this claim, to the best of my knowledge and research, is more figurative than literal. The rulers are thus Iranians, but it would be an understatement that the views and philosophies they extol are more religious than nationalist, with an Arabic and Muslim influence on thought and practice. When returning from Paris to Tehran, Khomeini was asked what his return to Iran meant to him: “hich” (or nothing) was his response. He subsequently also proclaimed that Iran was secondary to Islam, infuriating many Iranians, but endearing himself to the Muslim nation.

– Do Iranian minorities want to separate from Iran?

Not really. I try to be objective as possible and listen to all perspectives. The one thing that Iranians agree on is territorial integrity. Kurds of Iran overwhelmingly identify as Iranians, whereas Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Syria have faced more persecution, and as such, may seek independence. That Saddam gassed the Iraqi Kurds didn’t help with that sentiment. There have also been recent skirmishes in the Baluch area neighbouring Pakistan. I would say the Baluch – especially given the under-investment in the region and harsher treatment by the regime – share the sentiment moreso than the Kurds. Ultimately, by and large, Iranian minorities place their Iranian-ness above their ethnicity, due in no small part to the 5000 years of Iranian history dating back to 3200 BC. Even I, who grew up in the West, am secular, and generally disapprove of Iran’s policies say “you can take the kid out of Iran, but can’t take the Iran out of the kid,” despite not having walked on Iranian soil since I was 6, in 1984. This, admittedly, could be said about most nationalities, but fueled by our long history, incredible accomplishments and inventions, there’s certainly a higher level of nationalism amongst Iranians than many other ethnicities (granted, this is subjective and more for context, because most people consider me “Canadian” and not Iranian, per se).

– What does the current political landscape look like?

Iran is complicated and the cards can be shuffled in different ways to present the factions, but to narrow down and simplify some of the groups and philosophies,

1) the regime supporters may do so on
a) political,
b) ideological,
c) religious,
d) economic reasons.
While in America a lot of people criticize their government and may not support their commander-in-chief, in Iran this has taken on a different dimension. The low voter turnout in the 2024 parliamentary elections suggest that the percentage who support the current regime may be low (i.e. 10-25%, with some pegging it more at 5-20%).

But as Iran does not have a Second Amendment and the IRGC remains a key pillar of the power structure, the regime rules as it deems fit.

2) the reformists are those who don’t seek revolutionary change but seek to reform the existing regime through evolutionary means: more liberties, more power to the Majlis at the expense of the theocratic clerics, and so on. After a rise in popularity in the late 1990s with the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, this movement lost steam in the 2010s with Hassan Rouhani, who spearheaded the JCPOA with the Obama administration. Subsequent violent crackdowns eroded whatever support reformists had, and today, the “Esla Talab” (reformist) label is seen as an insult to many.

3) the separatists/federalists: while the one thing Iranians agree on is Iran’s territorial integrity, certain factions amongst the Kurds and Baluch ethnicities certainly share separatist, nationalistic sentiment. While Kurds in Iran identify as Iranians (unlike their brethren in Syria, Iraq and Turkey), the Baluch (a “nationless people”) found in Iran, Pakistan and a lesser extent, Afghanistan) do seem to express such feelings more. Recently, Iran and Pakistan’s bombed one another’s Baluch minorities in the other country’s territory, as a reminder of the unfortunate plight they are in. More alarmingly, Israeli media has sounded this separatist theme drumbeat, as a reminder to Iranians that foreign nations – like the Russians, British and Americans before it – do not necessarily have Iranian interests at heart. This doesn’t mean that Israel and opposition groups don’t share a common, current objective, but to forget the role that foreign governments have had on Iranian resources and people is concerning, as a student of history. And to be clear, I have always called out anti-semitism decades before 10/7; have investments in startups that employ Israelis; and would say this about any other nation.

It’s important to note that a common complaint of the regime is not merely a lack of freedoms, but also, the allocation of the nation’s resources – oil and natural gas, of note.

4) socialists (sometimes referred to as marxists in Iranian circles) were viewed by the late Shah as the main threat to his rule, and the rise of groups like the MEK have always cast a spectre over Iranian politics and affairs. The MEK, of note, aligned itself with Iraq after Khomeini kicked them out of the coalition who revolted against the Shah. They launched attacks against Iranians on Iranian soil, endearing them to no one. After Saddam was toppled in 2003 and American troops controlled Iraq, the MEK decamped to Albania and viewed America as its new sponsor… While Iranians do not view MEK as having any support domestically, American politicians like Mike Pence, Mike Pompeo have accepted speaking engagements at MEK events, and even Canadian politicians amongst the Progressive Conservatives have lent credence to the group by hosting and/or attending their events – which shocks Iranians.

5) the monarchists & royalists: the former favour a return of the constitutional monarchy (usually after a referendum post regime change) while the latter emphasize that only the Pahlavi family – by way of the exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi – are the only ones who can “rescue” the nation from the theocracy that has pitted Iran (or rather, the Islamic Republic of Iran) against the West and Israel. While monarchists represent a large share of Iranians in the diaspora, there are many inside Iran who may favour a republic form of government but distrust any and all politicians, and thus by default are willing to rally behind Pahlavi. How this regime change would take place remains conceptual in nature (i.e. “maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support to the people”).

As per the above-mentioned Gamaan and ERF.i surveys by organizations outside of Iran, if I were to summarize its findings: it’s as if most of the responders were unhappy with the regime and – all factors being equal – favored a republic, but ultimately they trusted Reza Pahlavi most, and as the crown prince would not return as prime minister in a republic, then the appeal of a constitutional monarchy has grown in the eyes of some. Ultimately, Reza Pahlavi represents a known brand which combined with the fact that Iranians lack trust in anyone else (many Iranians have grown to distrust and dislike republics), then he is by default the growing face of the opposition, with activists like Masih Alinejad, Hamid Esmaeilion et al. having little political support.

Given the growing strength of the Islamic Republic geo-politically, America’s growing Middle East fatigue, Israel being stretched on many fronts, the continued sale of oil and weapons to Russia and China, this could all be moot. But, history has never been drawn in a straight line.

Turning to a lighter set of questions I get asked / hear in conversations:

– Is Iran a desert?

Unlike many other countries in the Middle East that primarily made up of arid, lifeless desert, Iran’s geography is very different from those of surrounding nations. Compared with nearby Saudi Arabia (95% desert), Turkmenistan (80% desert) and Iraq (40% desert), only about 22% of its land area is desert. Most of Iran is mountainous, epitomized by Mount Davamand in Tehran. The country is centrally located between Japan and London, nestled in between the Persian Gulf to the south and Caspian Sea to the north. Its neighbouring nations Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan were at one point part of the Persian Empire, but more recently under the influence (at least in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan) under American influence. However, with the US leaving both countries, Iran is the dominant power in the region, competing with Turkey and Israel for regional supremacy.

As an epicurean, avid traveler and pretty good amateur cook, I would be remiss not to touch on food & travel, even if briefly.

– Is Iranian food spicy?

No. Unlike Indian food which is known to be spicy, Iranian cuisine is not spicy at all. It consists of herbs predominantly and spices include saffron, cumin, turmeric etc. Grilled meats – beef, chicken, lamb, veal – are similar to those found in Turkish and other cuisine (unsurprisingly given the back-and-forths of the culture over centuries) but the staples are rice-based dishes which are either mixed with herbs, spices and beans (like baghali or lubia polo – the term for rice in Farsi) or white rice served with stews consisting of herbs, spices and meats (like ghormeh sabzi or fessenjoon). Iranian cuisine does not have pork, not surprising since Islam bans pork.

– Is Iran dangerous for foreigners to visit?

No. While Iran has held multi-nationals on political grounds, by and large Iran is safe to tourists who visit for leisure to visit picturesque mosques, walk through bazars and take in the beautiful scenic aspects of the nation.

It would be insincere to publish an FAQ on Iran and exclude the reality that Iranian women have faced, so last but certainly not least:

– What is the plight of Iranian women?

During the 20th century, under the Shah, Iran gave women the right of vote (before even countries like Sweden), and people could do as they please. Without a doubt, the Islamic Republic curtailed certain freedoms, and Iranian women have bore the brunt of these practices more than others inside the country and relative to women elsewhere, but unlike for example in Saudi Arabia, women could drive, work, pursue higher learning and so on (though I fully concede that even writing this is a bit tragic). Many Iranian women like mathematician Maryam Mirzakhani, journalist Christiane Amanpour, lawyer Shirin Ebadi rose to the top of their respective fields. Please note, however, that I am not familiar with the political views of such women, so if you agree or disagree with any of them, I do not condone or condemn them and am merely listing their accomplishments.

Ultimately, Iran boasts conservative, religious women dressed top-to-toe in the “Chador” but given the young demographics (half of Iran’s population is under 35 years old), you will also see many young Iranian women with head scarfs revealing some of their hair (tragically sometimes with horrible outcomes), bright coloured clothing, high heels, and immaculately-styled. That said, without a doubt, the regime has cracked down with women paying the ultimate price, with victims like Mahsa Amini and Nika Shakarami being more high-profile cases, but sadly just a few in a long list of victims (including many men). Indeed, the so-called “morality police” has crystallized its reputation as a brutal and oppressive faction, with people rising and pushing back. The laws are constant, and/but depending on where you are, the enforcement is uneven, and depending on the political and social backdrop, the crackdown ebbs and flows.

To conclude: Iran remains a great nation thanks to it people. To understand why the Islamic Regime is where it is today, it’s important to put events in their historical context. To understand where it may go, it’s critical to look at the broader, macro picture. In a bipolar world, it’s not surprising to see it align with Russia and China in light of previous Western meddling.

Actions have reactions, and Iran is a paradox as a result of it all.

There are many more frequently-asked-questions, especially around the Iranian economy and the effect sanctions have had on these, but we’ll leave those for another day. If anything is incomplete or false, please don’t hesitate to reach out to me.