A four-move chess strategy to create a multibillion-dollar sports, media and entertainment holding company
From CF Montréal to the Expos, Nordiques and potentially an NBA franchise: a long-term investment thesis for Québec Sports, Media & Entertainment (QSME).
Investors generally prefer deploying more capital, not less.
That may sound counterintuitive, but in institutional investing, raising US$1 billion can sometimes be easier than raising US$1 million.
Why?
Because sophisticated investors have minimum deployment thresholds. The time, legal expenses, diligence and administrative burden of investing US$1 million can be surprisingly similar to investing US$100 million.
A billion-dollar opportunity also offers something that smaller investments frequently lack: the potential to build a platform.
And platforms can create value beyond the sum of their individual assets.
That is precisely the investment thesis behind Granicus — Québec Sports, Media & Entertainment (QSME).
Not merely acquiring CF Montréal.
Not merely restoring the Montréal Expos.
Not merely exploring the resurrection of the Québec Nordiques.
But potentially creating a Québec-based sports, media, entertainment and real estate holding company that, over time, could rival the organizational models of Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment, Fenway Sports Group, Kroenke Sports & Entertainment and Harris Blitzer Sports & Entertainment.
Not necessarily their valuations or geographic reach.
Their models.
Because each demonstrates that professional sports ownership can become something considerably more valuable than a collection of teams.
It can become an ecosystem.
Why hasn’t Québec already built this?
In the United States, ambition, competition and empire-building are practically institutionalized.
Stan Kroenke doesn’t simply own the Los Angeles Rams. His interests span the NFL, NBA, NHL, Premier League soccer and major sports real estate.
John Henry’s Fenway Sports Group expanded from the Boston Red Sox into Liverpool FC, the Pittsburgh Penguins and other sports investments.
Josh Harris and David Blitzer built a diversified portfolio across basketball, hockey, football and international soccer.
Larry Tanenbaum helped build MLSE into a powerful Canadian sports platform spanning hockey, basketball, soccer and entertainment.
In Québec, meanwhile, we have tremendous sporting history, substantial corporate wealth and extraordinarily passionate fans.
But we have not built an equivalent locally headquartered, multi-league ownership platform on the same scale.
Geoff Molson is an obvious person to consider.
He has the Montréal Canadiens, the Bell Centre, an established sports and entertainment infrastructure and deep corporate relationships.
He could have attempted to consolidate Québec’s major sports properties.
But he hasn’t.
If he had wanted to build a comprehensive Québec sports empire, one might reasonably argue that the opportunity has existed for years.
When Just for Laughs encountered difficulties, I was asked by RBC to assist ICM and subsequently expressed interest in exploring a solution (all privately). Once aware of our interest, Groupe CH subsequently became involved in the conversation (they had shown an interest early on, but ICM prevailed with the winning bid for a reason).
More recently, after I expressed interest in CF Montréal, Molson indicated that while the club was not necessarily a priority, he would consider opportunities in sports and entertainment.
From my perspective, it felt familiar.
That sequence does not establish that my actions caused his interest. But it highlights a distinction between reacting to an available asset and proactively building a platform.
And I believe Québec has an opportunity to pursue the latter.
The question is whether the opportunity can be organized into a credible capital allocation strategy.
That is where the chessboard comes in.
The chessboard: Four moves, four increasingly valuable platforms
Each move requires independent capital, league approval and commercial justification. The sequence is a strategy, not an announced acquisition or expansion schedule.
The fundamental insight is that the four moves are not equally difficult.
CF Montréal is an existing asset undergoing a sale process.
The Expos require MLB to create a new franchise through expansion.
The Nordiques require an NHL expansion, relocation or another approved transaction.
An NBA team requires an even more capital-intensive expansion or relocation opportunity, potentially in direct competition with Montréal’s existing sports and entertainment infrastructure.
Consequently, the sensible strategy isn’t to raise enough capital for all four immediately.
It is to build a holding company capable of absorbing successive acquisitions without overextending the original investors.
Benchmarking Granicus against the North American sports empires
Reported 2026 sports-empire valuations, US$ billions
The size of the established sports empires
CNBC’s June 2026 reported valuations; not QSME projections
Reported values reflect portfolio-level estimates, not necessarily the market value of the equity held by each controlling shareholder. Sports Business Journal
| Group | Core assets | Lesson for QSME |
|---|---|---|
| Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment | Maple Leafs, Raptors, Toronto FC, Argonauts, arena | Geographic concentration and corporate sales |
| Fenway Sports Group | Red Sox, Liverpool, Penguins, media interests | Global brands and integrated media |
| Kroenke Sports & Entertainment | Rams, Nuggets, Avalanche, Arsenal, venues | Real estate and venue control |
| Harris Blitzer Sports & Entertainment | 76ers, Devils, broader sports investments | Multi-league diversification and operating expertise |
| Granicus QSME — proposed | CF, Expos, Nordiques, potentially NBA | Québec identity, bilingual media, education, travel and mixed-use development |
The most relevant benchmark is MLSE.
In October 2026, Rogers completed its acquisition of the remaining 25% of MLSE from Kilmer Sports for C$4.35 billion. That transaction implies approximately C$17.4 billion for 100% of MLSE, assuming the minority block is valued proportionally. It is a transaction-implied figure, not an independent appraisal of every underlying asset. About Rogers
That matters because MLSE isn’t simply a portfolio of sports teams. It has an arena, a massive corporate sponsorship platform, premium hospitality inventory, commercial rights and an unusually attractive Toronto market.
QSME cannot simply apply MLSE’s multiple to Montréal.
It needs to determine which economic advantages are replicable and which aren’t.
Montréal versus Toronto: The market-size reality
One cannot build a credible investment thesis by pretending Montréal and Toronto have identical economic characteristics.
They don’t.
CANADIAN METROPOLITAN MARKET COMPARISON
| Metric | Montréal | Toronto |
|---|---|---|
| Metro population, 2025 | 4.60M | 7.11M |
| Metro GDP, 2022 | C$279.5B | C$522.4B |
| Population relative to Toronto | 65% | 100% |
| GDP relative to Toronto | 54% | 100% |
Population and GDP are for census metropolitan areas, not US television DMAs. GDP is nominal and uses the same 2022 reference year for comparability. Canadian Economic Atlas
Toronto’s metropolitan economy is approximately 1.87 times Montréal’s, using these comparable GDP figures.
Its population is approximately 1.55 times larger.
And Toronto benefits from a greater concentration of Canadian national corporate headquarters, financial institutions and large advertising accounts. The City of Toronto identifies 692 Canadian head offices in its metropolitan area. City of Toronto
That translates into a potentially larger sponsorship market, greater premium-seat demand and more capacity to support multiple expensive professional franchises.
But Montréal has advantages of its own.
It has an international cultural identity, a strong tourism industry, a substantial French-language media market, major universities, established sports loyalties and the opportunity to reach francophone audiences far beyond Québec.
The relevant market for QSME should not be limited to the number of households within driving distance of a stadium.
It should combine three concentric markets:
- Local: Ticket sales, premium seating, local sponsorship and in-person experiences.
- Provincial: Montréal and Québec City, including corporate partnerships, regional media and merchandise.
- International: Francophone audiences, expatriate communities, tourism, digital media and global sports partnerships.
The third category offers growth opportunities, but it cannot be valued like guaranteed local broadcast revenue.
And while US DMA rankings are useful for comparing American expansion candidates, Canadian markets should be assessed using census metropolitan populations, television reach, language markets and national media economics.
Foreign exchange: A structural consideration
Assume, for illustration, C$1.37 per US dollar.
A US$2 billion MLB franchise fee would cost approximately C$2.74 billion.
A US$5 billion NBA expansion fee would cost approximately C$6.85 billion.
Yet many local revenues—tickets, concessions, Canadian sponsorships—would be collected in Canadian dollars.
Meanwhile, league fees, certain player expenses and financing obligations may be denominated in US dollars.
That currency mismatch cannot be ignored.
QSME would need a disciplined treasury strategy involving currency hedging, USD-denominated revenue opportunities, appropriate debt matching and conservative exchange-rate assumptions.
The bigger the empire, the more important this becomes.
Move One: CF Montréal — Establish the Platform
2027–2028
Acquisition, operational turnaround, platform formation
Most actionable
CF Montréal represents the most logical first move because it is an existing operating franchise, with an established league position, brand, academy, supporter base and commercial infrastructure.
Joey Saputo formally launched the sale process on November 9, 2026, retaining BMO Capital Markets and National Bank Capital Markets as advisors, with a stated priority of identifying Québec-based investors. CF Montréal
The club was valued at approximately US$440 million by Forbes in February 2026, according to contemporary reporting, but that is not necessarily what a buyer would pay. Sportsnet.ca
For modeling purposes, I would use a hypothetical acquisition enterprise-value range of US$300M–400M, subject to due diligence, stadium rights, liabilities, league obligations and any seller rollover.
The first priority would not be to transform CF Montréal overnight into a multibillion-dollar business.
It would be to establish QSME as a credible sports operator.
That means stabilizing sporting performance, rebuilding relationships with supporters, strengthening commercial revenue and implementing the SPORTS + MEDIA + TRAVEL + ACADEMIA strategy.
The stadium question
Stade Saputo is a major issue.
MLS’s transition toward a fall-to-spring calendar creates serious winter-operating challenges. The existing stadium is not winterized, and the club faces scheduling complications during the transition. Sportsnet.ca
QSME should evaluate three alternatives:
| Stadium strategy | Advantages | Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| Winterize Stade Saputo | Preserves established home | Engineering, capital cost, winter comfort |
| Olympic Stadium partnership | Indoor match capability | Availability, economics, venue experience |
| New shared sports campus | Greater long-term integration | Land, financing, construction and competing needs |
The preferred solution may be a hybrid: retain Stade Saputo for suitable dates while negotiating an indoor winter solution.
A new soccer stadium at the Expos’ proposed Carrie-Derick site should not be presumed viable. It would require a separate land-use and design analysis, and it could compromise the baseball campus.
Move One valuation
A plausible illustrative 2030 value for a stabilized CF Montréal platform is US$400M–650M, including incremental media and commercial businesses only to the extent they have demonstrated earnings and are not already captured in the franchise valuation.
The upper end assumes meaningful operational improvement and a supportive MLS valuation environment.
The acquisition alone does not create an MLSE.
It creates the operating foundation from which QSME can attempt its next move.
Move Two: CF Montréal + Montréal Expos — The Transformational Move
2030–2033
Conditional MLB expansion and new stadium development
High-impact, high-uncertainty
The Expos change the entire equation.
Where CF Montréal is an acquisition of an existing franchise, the Expos would involve creating a new MLB club through expansion.
That distinction matters.
A new franchise can generate incremental economic activity and establish an entirely new institution, rather than simply changing the ownership of an existing asset.
The proposed structure separates the baseball franchise from stadium and infrastructure ownership.
For planning purposes:
- MLB expansion franchise: approximately US$2.0B.
- Retractable-roof stadium: approximately US$1.5B.
- Additional infrastructure, environmental work and 4C development: separately financed and phased.
These are working assumptions, not approved costs or committed financing.
The Expos would also introduce a much larger inventory of games and events than CF Montréal alone.
MLB’s regular-season schedule creates 81 home games, compared with a substantially smaller number of MLS home matches.
That matters for sponsorship, concessions, hospitality, merchandise, media and the utilization of adjacent commercial real estate.
But it also creates substantial operating costs.
The Carrie-Derick opportunity
The proposed stadium site near Carrie-Derick and the Bridge-Bonaventure district presents an opportunity to integrate baseball with the broader 4C concept:
Creative. Cultural. Commercial. Campus.
Potential elements include a museum, hospitality, restaurants, entertainment, commercial development and the Academy and Study of Entrepreneurship.
The stadium itself would be designed for baseball, with a retractable roof and a target capacity of at least 35,000.
It should not be assumed to accommodate MLS soccer efficiently or economically.
The more defensible strategy is to share commercial infrastructure rather than force two sports into one unsuitable venue.
Shared functions could include ticketing, sponsorship sales, content production, analytics, hospitality partnerships, procurement and selected administrative services.
Move Two valuation
For an illustrative 2033 scenario:
| Asset | Hypothetical value |
|---|---|
| CF Montréal | $450M–700M |
| Expos franchise | $2.3B–3.2B |
| Net stadium/4C equity value | $300M–1.0B |
| Combined gross asset/equity-value indication | $3.05B–4.9B |
US dollars. These figures are speculative scenario ranges, not appraisals. Stadium/4C equity is net of project-level debt; franchise values are assumed unlevered. QSME shareholder equity would be lower after holding-company debt and minority ownership interests.
The Expos are the transformational move because they could change QSME from a regional sports operator into a major North American sports ownership platform.
But MLB approval, franchise capitalization and stadium financing are independent conditions. None is guaranteed by the acquisition of CF Montréal.
Move Three: CF Montréal + Expos + Nordiques — A Two-City Québec Sports Platform
2032–2036
Conditional NHL expansion or relocation
The Nordiques introduce a different dimension: geographic diversification within Québec.
Instead of concentrating every franchise in Montréal, QSME could operate a province-wide sports platform spanning Montréal and Québec City.
That matters commercially.
Montréal and Québec City are distinct markets, but they share language, culture, media consumption, major corporate relationships and substantial historical sports loyalties.
The Nordiques also have something money cannot easily manufacture.
An established identity that survives decades after the team itself disappeared.
The challenge is not whether Québec City remembers the Nordiques.
It is whether an NHL franchise can be secured at a price and under conditions that make financial sense.
An NHL expansion or relocation would require league approval, an acceptable ownership group, sufficient capital and a convincing long-term business case.
The arena advantage
Unlike the Expos, the Nordiques would not necessarily require construction of an entirely new arena.
The Videotron Centre already exists.
That is an enormous advantage.
But its existence does not mean QSME would automatically control the building or its economics.
The key questions would be who controls the arena, how an NHL tenant would participate in concessions, premium seating, naming rights, sponsorship, non-hockey events and ancillary revenue, and what capital improvements might be required.
This is particularly important because the strongest sports holding companies don’t merely own teams.
They capture meaningful economics from the venues in which those teams play.
The commercial thesis
A three-team QSME could offer advertisers access to baseball, soccer and hockey across two Québec markets.
Rather than selling three unrelated sponsorship packages, QSME could sell integrated relationships.
A financial institution might sponsor all three teams.
A telecommunications provider could distribute content across multiple platforms.
A hotel group could partner with the Expos and CF Montréal on international travel while serving Nordiques visitors in Québec City.
ASE could serve athletes from all three franchises.
The media operation could develop programming across the entire portfolio.
But the teams would still compete for some of the same household entertainment spending and corporate sponsorship budgets. Shared ownership creates cross-selling opportunities, not three independent pools of customers.
Move Three valuation
Assuming a Nordiques franchise is actually awarded or acquired, an illustrative 2036 scenario would be:
| Asset | Hypothetical value |
|---|---|
| CF Montréal | $500M–800M |
| Expos franchise | $2.6B–3.8B |
| Nordiques franchise | $1.5B–2.5B |
| Net stadium/real estate equity | $400M–1.3B |
| Combined indication | $5.0B–8.4B |
US dollars, before holding-company debt and minority-interest adjustments. These ranges assume successful franchise awards, a functioning baseball stadium, a viable NHL arena agreement and no double counting of commercial subsidiaries.
The biggest constraint is not QSME’s ambition.
It is the NHL’s willingness to put a franchise in Québec City.
And no financial model can substitute for league approval.
Move Four: Add an NBA Franchise — The Queen on the Chessboard
2035–2042+
Speculative NBA expansion or relocation opportunity
The fourth move is the most ambitious and arguably the least immediately actionable.
An NBA franchise would potentially elevate QSME into the same broad category of multi-league ownership groups as MLSE.
It would also create enormous financial demands.
For modeling purposes, assume a hypothetical US$5B–7B NBA franchise entry cost in a future expansion or relocation scenario. That is a planning range, not an NBA-announced price for Montréal.
At US$5 billion, even a 20% ownership stake requires US$1 billion in equity before any additional capital requirements.
At US$7 billion, that same 20% represents US$1.4 billion.
This is why the ownership structure becomes essential.
QSME would not necessarily need to own 100% of every franchise.
It could hold controlling or significant minority interests in separate subsidiaries, alongside league-approved strategic investors.
But that also means one must distinguish between the total value of the franchises associated with QSME and the value attributable to QSME’s actual ownership.
The NBA stadium problem
This is where the chessboard becomes complicated.
Montréal already has the Bell Centre.
And the Bell Centre is controlled by an established sports and entertainment organization whose primary asset is the Canadiens.
A hypothetical NBA team would need a suitable arena arrangement.
Three possibilities exist.
| NBA venue strategy | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Bell Centre lease or partnership | Most capital-efficient if commercially and operationally acceptable |
| New NBA arena | Greater control, but potentially very expensive and risky |
| Joint arena venture | Could align competing interests, but requires negotiated ownership and revenue rights |
A new arena cannot be justified simply by assuming NBA expansion.
The capital cost, premium-seat demand, competition for concerts and scheduling conflicts would all need to be modeled.
And if the Bell Centre can accommodate NBA basketball under a commercially attractive arrangement, constructing a competing arena might destroy value rather than create it.
The best move in chess is not always the one that captures another piece. Sometimes it’s the one that avoids unnecessary conflict.
Move Four valuation
For a hypothetical mature platform in 2040–2042:
| Asset | Illustrative value |
|---|---|
| CF Montréal | $600M–1.0B |
| Expos franchise | $3.0B–5.0B |
| Nordiques franchise | $2.0B–3.5B |
| NBA franchise | $5.0B–8.0B |
| Net real estate and other incremental businesses | $500M–2.0B |
| Total underlying platform assets | $11.1B–19.5B |
These are nominal future US-dollar scenario values, not present values. They assume all four franchises exist and participate in QSME’s structure.
A crucial distinction: US$19.5 billion of associated underlying assets would not mean Granicus itself was worth US$19.5 billion.
If Granicus owned only 20% of the NBA franchise, 35% of the Expos, 60% of the Nordiques and 100% of CF Montréal, its attributable equity would be a fraction of the combined asset values.
The proper valuation would be a sum-of-the-parts analysis using actual ownership percentages, net debt, preferred equity and holding-company obligations.
The four-move forecast: How big could Granicus become?
Illustrative underlying asset values by chess move
US$ billions; scenario ranges, not committed transactions
■ Low scenario
■ High scenario
Different prospective completion years; these are not same-date comparisons. Values represent underlying franchise and incremental net real estate assets, not QSME’s attributable shareholder equity.
The growth appears dramatic, but most of it comes from adding expensive assets funded with new capital—not simply from operational value creation.
That distinction is fundamental.
A company that acquires US$5 billion of assets by issuing US$5 billion of new equity has not automatically created US$5 billion of value for its original shareholders.
The investment thesis must demonstrate that QSME can generate returns through some combination of appreciation, cash distributions, development profits, better operating performance and incremental commercial earnings.
A more realistic ownership model
Consider the following purely illustrative ownership structure at maturity.
| Asset | QSME ownership | Midpoint asset value | Attributable value |
|---|---|---|---|
| CF Montréal | 100% | $800M | $800M |
| Expos | 35% | $4.0B | $1.4B |
| Nordiques | 60% | $2.75B | $1.65B |
| NBA | 20% | $6.5B | $1.3B |
| Incremental net real estate equity | 50% | $1.25B | $625M |
| Total | $15.3B | $5.775B |
Under this example, QSME’s gross attributable interests would be approximately US$5.8 billion, before any additional holding-company debt, corporate costs, minority protections or holding-company discount.
That is still a potentially significant business.
But it is a much more defensible valuation than claiming to own a US$15 billion empire outright.
It also demonstrates the strategic importance of retaining meaningful ownership in the early assets before raising successive rounds of capital.
Timeline: A realistic sequence rather than four simultaneous bets
The order of moves could change.
If an NHL opportunity became available before MLB expansion, QSME might need to evaluate it.
If the NBA offered a compelling expansion opportunity, the organization could consider a minority position rather than a controlling stake.
But the discipline should remain the same: never let a speculative future acquisition jeopardize an existing franchise.
The real value creation: What does QSME do that four independent owners cannot?
The objective should not simply be to assemble four teams.
It should be to create an operating platform that makes each business more valuable than it would be independently.
That means integrating the functions that benefit from scale while preserving the distinct identities of each franchise.
The QSME operating model
A holding company could consolidate sponsorship sales, digital media, certain administrative functions, data analytics, procurement and selected hospitality relationships.
But each franchise must retain sufficient autonomy to satisfy its league’s ownership and operational requirements.
The real estate assets should also be held in appropriate subsidiaries, with financing structured to avoid exposing one franchise to the liabilities of another.
A hypothetical recurring operating upside
Suppose the shared platform eventually produces the following incremental annual EBITDA, after direct costs and without counting revenue already included in franchise operations:
| Business | Annual incremental EBITDA |
|---|---|
| Media and content | $8M–20M |
| Travel and experiences | $3M–10M |
| Education and ASE partnerships | $1M–5M |
| Shared operating efficiencies | $5M–15M |
| Total | $17M–50M |
These are illustrative targets, not existing earnings or independently validated forecasts.
At an assumed 8–12× EBITDA valuation multiple, that would suggest US$136M–600M of potential incremental enterprise value—but only if those earnings are genuinely incremental, sustainable and not already embedded in the franchises’ valuations.
This is where the platform thesis can create value beyond buying teams and waiting for franchise appreciation.
Three scenarios for Granicus in 2040
Rather than treating all four moves as inevitable, investors should evaluate the business under three distinct outcomes.
| Scenario | Portfolio achieved | Underlying asset value |
|---|---|---|
| Conservative | CF Montréal only | $400M–650M |
| Base-case ambition | CF + Expos | $3.05B–4.9B |
| Upside | CF + Expos + Nordiques | $5.0B–8.4B |
| Transformational | All four franchises | $11.1B–19.5B |
These are illustrative asset-value scenarios at different stages, not probability-weighted forecasts. They exclude the possibility of substantial losses or failed expansion efforts. Nor do they represent the equity value attributable to QSME shareholders.
For underwriting purposes, I would not include an NBA franchise in the base case. I would also keep the Nordiques as a separately approved, separately financed opportunity.
Even the Expos should remain a contingent investment until MLB approves an expansion award.
The platform must make economic sense with CF Montréal alone.
The investment proposition: Think bigger, but deploy capital intelligently
This returns us to the original observation.
Institutional investors often prefer large, scalable opportunities.
But there’s an important distinction between having a multibillion-dollar vision and asking investors to commit billions of dollars before the assets are available.
The first is ambition.
The second can become an expensive mistake.
A more intelligent structure would be to establish Granicus as the parent company, raise sufficient capital for CF Montréal and the initial operating platform, and secure conditional commitments or investment rights for subsequent acquisitions.
Each major franchise would have its own capitalization, investors and league-approved governance structure.
Investors who wanted exposure to the full QSME platform could invest at the holding-company level.
Those interested only in baseball, hockey, soccer or real estate could participate in the relevant subsidiary, subject to league rules.
That structure would also accommodate the reality that a US$300 million soccer investment and a multibillion-dollar MLB franchise require different capital providers.
It is how Granicus could evolve without requiring every original investor to fund every subsequent move.
Conclusion: Québec doesn’t need another sports owner. It needs a sports ownership strategy.
Montréal has hockey.
It has soccer.
It has a remarkable baseball history.
Québec City has an extraordinary hockey legacy.
And the province has the entrepreneurs, institutions, creative talent and financial resources to support something more ambitious than isolated ownership groups operating in separate silos.
The question is whether anyone can organize those resources into a coherent strategy.
MLSE demonstrated the power of concentrating multiple franchises in one major Canadian market.
Fenway demonstrated the value of international brands and media.
Kroenke demonstrated the importance of venue control and real estate.
Harris Blitzer demonstrated how a multi-league portfolio can expand over time.
Granicus could borrow from all four models while developing something distinctly Québécois.
Not by copying their scale overnight.
But by building one asset at a time.
First, CF Montréal.
Then, potentially, the Expos.
Then the Nordiques.
And, if the opportunity and economics ever align, perhaps an NBA franchise.
In chess, the opening matters. But it is the ability to anticipate several moves ahead that separates a good player from a great one.
The objective isn’t to acquire four sports franchises. It’s to create a holding company capable of owning, operating and growing four franchises without losing the identity that made each one valuable in the first place.
And perhaps that is the greatest difference between simply buying sports assets and building a sports empire.
One is a transaction.
The other is a strategy.
Granicus is the strategy. And at that point, why stop there?
Research and modeling notes
The current CF Montréal sale process and stated preference for Québec investors are confirmed by the club’s November 9 announcement. CF Montréal
Molson publicly denied actively pursuing CF Montréal on November 6, while maintaining that Groupe CH evaluates sports and entertainment opportunities. Geoff Molson The claim that his interest followed Karbasfrooshan’s involvement with CF or Just for Laughs is presented as an interpretation of the chronology, not an established causal relationship.
The peer valuations are sourced from June 2026 reporting on CNBC’s sports-empire rankings. Sports Business Journal
Toronto and Montréal population and GDP comparisons use Statistics Canada-based metropolitan data. Canadian Economic Atlas
All QSME acquisition prices, timelines, projected asset values, ownership percentages and operating EBITDA figures are analytical scenarios. They are not confirmed bids, league-approved expansion plans or investment commitments.
The central investment conclusion: A QSME platform reaching US$5B–8B in underlying assets through CF Montréal, the Expos and Nordiques is a conceivable long-term upside scenario, but its feasibility is overwhelmingly determined by league approvals, capital structure and venue economics—not merely by the size of Québec’s sports market.

