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I believe in radical transparency—while remaining fiercely confidential about other people’s affairs. The Peanut Project is, at its core, a civic effort with an outcome I do not control. I work for you, and hold myself accountable for my inputs and effort, even though success would not guarantee me a role.
As tonight I watch our Montreal Canadiens take on the Colorado Avalanche, I am reminded of the last time the two teams clashed, which literally kicked off the nexus of the effort to bring back the Expos.
The Irony of Success—and the Risk of Being Sidelined
At that point, I looked up the status of the previous group’s effort and read that that chapter was closed. That realization triggered an epiphany: the only way to solve this was through proper financial engineering, and since no one was at the time leading the efforts, I tried to solve the equation.
Sixty days later, it would take an extraordinary event for us not to submit a proposal to the league when the expansion window opens around 2028. There is far more institutional capital that I can invite in the capital stack (there would be more if I wanted to pursue the team acquisition path, versus expansion), and once I mapped the optimal matchmaking to maximize demand from potential principal anchor investors—based on conversations held in January alone—I became confident we could attract multiple HNWIs and family offices. I am now scheduling meetings. If anything, the real challenge now is slowing things down, as each interested partner that stands to profit from the team becoming a reality is reinforcing my efforts to identify the anchor investor. It’s surreal. But that is how network effects work.
To solve a problem, you have to consider why previous efforts failed. Even in success, there’s always things I would do differently, better.
“Why do you think the previous effort failed?”
I was hesitant to reach out to the previous bidders, fearing it may come across as disrespectful, rubbing salt in wounds. I will not share what any individual told me. What follows is a consensus drawn from conversations with senior executives, investors, private-equity professionals, and long-time insiders. Because I find myself repeating things, it’s easier to sometimes publish an article and share it.
Why the Previous Expos Bid Was DOA
If this were a case study at ASE, the Academy & Study of Entrepreneurship at 4C, this is how I would break it down, in no real particular order.
8. The Split-Season Model Was Fundamentally Broken
The proposal to split a season between Montreal and Tampa Bay failed not because of nostalgia or market demand, but because it violated MLB’s core operating logic.
A split season created structural complexity with no upside: divided fan bases, diluted local identity, logistical inefficiencies, and an unwanted precedent. Rather than solving Tampa’s attendance issues or Montreal’s absence, it compounded both. You now had two unanswered stadium questions.
The model asked MLB to accept permanent ambiguity—two cities, two fan bases, one franchise—which runs counter to the league’s preference for clarity, stability, and single-market accountability. It was clever, even creative—but it solved a problem MLB did not define as theirs.
7. Relocation vs. Expansion
Optics matter. Expansion is almost always preferable to relocation, particularly from a PR and governance standpoint. Relocation ultimately implies MLB and baseball failed. Expansion suggests baseball is thriving, in demand, and growing.
6. Fairness to Other Owners
Allowing one owner (Sternberg) to operate in two markets created an obvious imbalance. Other owners understandably asked why one franchise should enjoy dual-market leverage and optionality.
5. Private Equity Structural Conflicts
The city of Montreal is lucky to have families like the Molsons, the Desmarais, the Peladeaus, the Bombardiers, and of course the Bronfmans. Seagram founder Sam Bronfman was an OG entrepreneur. His biography remains one of my favourites. The parallel of his sons Charles bringing the Expos in 1969 and Edgar Sr taking over World Jewish Congress to help Jews post WWII at a time when I am helping Iranians in my own way is not lost on me. Even in the third generation, I respect Edgar Jr.’s early vision into what ultimately became synergy and streaming, and Stephen (Charles’ son)’s Claridge, a private equity fund with many investments, given my own Granicus Group fund.
But as a finance trained person, without even speaking to anyone I instinctively knew that if Stephen Bronfman were anchoring the check, that implied certain rights and vetoes. If Claridge were involved, the structure veered into private equity—clashing with other PE funds investing 15% each, or 30% in aggregate as PEs. Asking a single individual to anchor that scale of capital under those constraints was unrealistic, given the new era of sports franchise ownership.
4. Capital Capacity Post-Vivendi
In 2000, Edgar Bronfman Jr. was head of Seagram, taking over from his father Edgar Sr. Seagram merged with Vivendi, largely taking stock rather than cash. When Vivendi’s share price collapsed—Time reported a 71% drop—it significantly eroded the family’s liquid flexibility. I’ve written about M&A for twenty five years and wanted to be an M&A banker when in business school. The difference between successes and failure in M&A are culture and structure. I don’t expect the baseball loving community to know all the in’s and out’s of this universe but even if a family remains wealthy, today’s MLB-scale commitments require broader syndication and structured capital, not legacy-era concentration.
3. Loria Lawsuit Legacy
When the Brochu-era Expos limited partners filed their RICO/fraud lawsuit against MLB and Jeffrey Loria on July 17, 2002, eight of today’s MLB ownership groups were already in place and remain owners today—the Red Sox (John W. Henry), Blue Jays (Rogers Communications), White Sox (Jerry Reinsdorf), Guardians (Paul Dolan), Rockies (Charlie Monfort), Phillies (John S. Middleton), Pirates (Robert Nutting), and Cardinals (William DeWitt Jr.). I do not think this came into play, to be candid, but in my experience, Americans sue one another the way Canadians change tires: routinely and without moral drama. They may temporarily “forgive” or “forget” when there’s a commercial reason to do so—but in practice, they do neither. I was sued frivolously, I forgave, but never forgot.
2. Quebec Inc.
I have alluded to Quebec Inc.’s cautious posture versus the Bay Area’s “first check” mindset. But here, because Montreal is a distinct and unique society, Quebec Inc seems to have – if not a sense of entitlement – a false sense of expectation. There is a difference between right and privilege. Even well-intentioned, “born on third base” leaders often react rather than initiate. I don’t dwell on it, focusing instead to reward the early believers. One example is a waiting list for seasons’ tickets.
1. Leverage—Plain and Simple
Tampa Bay ownership used Montreal as leverage—no differently than ICM used me before concluding their deal with CH and Bell Media to acquire Just for Laughs. The same dynamic played out when Just for Laughs transitioned from catalyst-driven momentum to institutional control via Molson and ICM.
That is business.
I know because I lived it. And in that case, it saved me $25 million.
Diplomacy vs. Psychological Inertia
Some assess and evaluate others based on pedigree, others by capacity. To the establishment, I can appear unconventional or disruptive. But I am a disciplined, conservative person who just happens to have incredible amounts of creative energy, a natural thirst for problem solving and loving to prove naysayers wrong. In Persian, this psychological complex (oghdeh) can be destructive, but I have learned to balance my pride to avoid it from becoming hubris. I am also an extremely respectful and polite person, rooted in Persian etiquette (târof)
Many assume that if baseball returns to Montreal, it must pass through “approved” gatekeepers. History rarely works that way. Movements do not begin with permission; they begin with someone willing to act.
Entrepreneurship is a means to an end. Money is energy to be applied to challenges. I have navigated frivolous lawsuits, platform risk, copyright chaos, and algorithmic upheaval—complex systems many decision-makers underestimate.
We are preparing a baseball-first, community-driven, financially complaint proposal. The only real test for me is patience. Until then: waiting list for seasons’ tickets.